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This paper investigates the fundamental nature of conflict within an existential-phenome-
nological approach. Despite extensive research having been carried out on the phenomenon 
of conflict, little attention has been paid to its correlation with the ontological paradox. In 
this context, the present paper attempts to locate a uniform ground for an understanding of 
the entity of conflict by means of rethinking the specific position of man within Being. This 
becomes possible through the unfolding of a complex existential-phenomenological meth-
odology consisting of a description of participants experiencing the paradoxical nature of 
conflict. Conflict is sure to consist of an encounter between opposites, incompatibilities or 
contradicting parties. However, where do these opposites originate and where are these 
contradicting parties located? The search for answers reveals that ignoring (avoidance) an 
understanding of the situation, as well as a rush to an immediate resolution of the conflict, 
appears to be unproductive. One of the possible solutions might be found within the onto-
logical paradox in terms of phenomenological attentive consideration and existential effort 
for accepting the insolvability of a conflict. Nevertheless, this way reveals a paradoxical path 
for productively dealing with the nature of human conflict, allowing a thorough under-
standing in the categories of finitude, entirety, “inner war,” self-state and effort of accept-
ance. This complex approach may be further applied within both philosophical and socio-
political research areas based on the represented categories. For example, investigations of 
such phenomena as crisis, habit, change, innovation, etc., are of great interest in terms of 
harmonisation of self-state and effort for acceptance. 
Keywords: conflict, nature of conflict, existential-phenomenological approach, ontological 
paradox, effort of acceptance. 
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1. Introduction
The phenomenon of conflict has received much attention within diverse disciplines 
in recent years, primarily as a consequence of the escalation of contemporary interna-
tional conflicts. The word “conflict” has a Latin origin and in the broadest sense may be 
considered as a “hassle,” which is characterised by the presence of contradiction taking 
the form of disagreement. Extensive psychological, sociological, political, economic, lin-
guistic and cultural research has been carried out in order to classify conflicts, identify 
their causes and find ways to manage conflict situations that arise [1–4]. However, despite 
the abundance of theories and methodologies within conflict studies, researchers remain 
in serious disagreement concerning the dangers and benefits of conflicts, approaches to 
overcoming them, similarities and differences between conflicts of diverse scales, etc. This 
lack of unity in conflict-related discourse may be due to a lack of clarity concerning the 
nature of conflict [5, p. 531]. Philosophical research, which aims at clarity in discussing 
the fundamental nature of things, may therefore yield insights concerning the essential 
nature of conflict.
The phenomenon of conflict has been investigated since ancient times, with classical 
Greek thinkers such as Thucydides and Plato, in particular, providing a perspective on 
conflict within discussions related to human nature. In his History of the Peloponnesian 
War, Thucydides drew attention to an interesting feature of the conflict between the peo-
ples of Athens and Sparta, distinguishing the underlying reasons for their enmity from the 
discrete occasions that gave rise to the declaration of war. Thucydides came to the conclu-
sion that the true causes of conflict reside in human vices such as envy, fear, lust for power 
and acquisitiveness [6, p. 2–43]. Then, is the entity of conflict rooted in human nature? 
Plato approaches this question in such works as First Alcibiades, Republic, Laws, etc. [7–9]. 
In the light of the understanding of Being as Good — and considering questions of justice, 
injustice and obligation — Plato discusses the causes of disagreement between people even 
within the same city-state. The medieval tradition, in reconstructing the Platonic and Ar-
istotelian understanding of Good within the concept of creationism, conceives conflict 
in terms of the inner struggle of opposing conceptions of virtue and evil and those of sin 
and desire for the salvation of the soul [10–12]. During the secularisation and refocusing 
of European thought according to principles of “rationality,” understandings of the nature 
of conflict shifted towards the struggle of reason as an ontological ground for combating 
exposure to the irrational [13; 14, p. 1–36; 15; 16, p. 6–105; 17]. However, non-classical 
philosophy called into question the primacy and autonomy of the thinking consciousness, 
and hence the possibility of overcoming the irrational [18; 19]. 
Taking diverse approaches, numerous 20th-century philosophical works have been 
dedicated to analysing the nature of conflict and the specifics of its concrete exposure. 
For example, existential thinkers locate the entity of conflict in experiencing co-existence 
with the Other [20–22]. In particular, Jean-Paul Sartre explores ways of establishing re-
lationships with the Other in the light of the fundamental separateness of the I from the 
Other; however, he arrives at the tragic, unsolvable contradictions involved in construct-
ing relations between people [23, p. 301–558]. With regard to conflict on a social scale 
(for example, in his Overcoming of Metaphysics), Martin Heidegger explores the tendency 
of contemporary conflicts to push the Nietzschean concept of “will to power” to its limit, 
and, in its further functioning as “will to will,” to convert everything into nothing [24]. 
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The thinkers of the postmodern tendency develop this idea in their own manner, com-
prehending the phenomena of dominance of Structure, of human beings brought under 
control by Power, and of their subordination to Ideology, Discourse and Unconsciousness 
[25–28]. 
The plurality of ontological grounds within the contemporary situation prevents the 
possibility of establishing a single, reliable reference point when attempting to understand 
the nature of conflict. Is it caused by structures external to human consciousness or is it 
entirely conditioned by internal factors? Is it possible to know how to be and how to act 
within a conflict situation? Can the phenomenon of conflict ever be resolved entirely or 
should attempts be made to mitigate it taking a piecemeal approach? Answering similar 
questions, the philosophical directions of the “rational corps” stop in front of the cases of 
non-conscious conflict, since consciousness in itself cannot struggle with the non-con-
scious. For instance, psychologists show that “goal conflicts can occur outside of conscious 
awareness” [29, p. 521]. Taking into account the irrational component of human beings, 
other philosophical approaches come to an understanding of conflict as the “conflict of 
identity” in light of the vagueness of both the I and the Other [30; 31]. Eventually, the 
category of conflict itself becomes blurred and the reasons for the reproduction of conflict 
are allocated to forces beyond human control. 
Despite the fact that much has been done to clarify the entity of conflict from differ-
ent perspectives in the history of philosophical thought, little attention has been paid to 
consideration of the phenomenon of conflict through the fundamental ontological para-
dox of human existence. The present paper elucidates the nature of conflict by carrying 
out a phenomenological analysis of the initial paradox with which man deals in its exis-
tential situation. Inspired by the works of such Russian thinkers as Mikhail Bakhtin, Mer-
ab Mamardashvili, Vladimir Bibikhin and Elena Bakeeva, my approach unfolds a vision of 
the entity of conflict in its entirety by practising the particular methodology of acceptance 
of paradox as the non-uprootable given of Being. The productivity of this methodology 
is provided by the techniques of clarification of the sense of conflict by dipping into the 
existential situation of its participative experiencing. As a result, refraining the conflict 
becomes possible in a paradoxical way by means of working with the inner encounter of 
opposing sides, working on harmonisation of the self-state that takes its place also enrich-
ing the experiencing one by senses.
2. Practical phenomenology and fundamental ontological paradox: 
Approaching the nature of conflict in its participative experience
Generally, researchers choose a “reductionist” or “differentialist” strategy in ap-
proaching the nature of conflict. The first consists in the reduction of diverse conflict 
cases to one basic model. Hence, every conflict situation may be explained by imposing 
the basic model on the real situation as a scheme, which abstracts common “conflict fea-
tures” from considered situations. Semantic analysis of “the ontology of conflict” [32] may 
serve as a shining example of the “reductionist” strategy. Also aimed at making the nature 
of conflict clear, the second strategy represents a differentiation between types of conflict, 
more precisely, between different means by which conflict emerges and develops as well as 
means for resolution or negotiation. Ultimately, every conflict situation is supposed to be 
unique; thus, each case is expected to deepen an understanding of the fundamental nature 
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of conflict. Undoubtedly, a scientific approach is not conducive to an understanding of the 
uniqueness of every case; therefore, diverse classification techniques are typically applied 
to theorising the phenomenon of conflict. Although classification schemes combine both 
generalisation and individualisation, they are necessarily grounded on the difference as it 
is. Based on this assumption, numerous types of conflict have been distinguished due to 
the differences in terms of structure as well as the social roles and goals of various actors 
within a given conflict [33]. “Case study” variations are also frequently provided under the 
heading of “differentialist” methodology. To sum up, the “reductionist” strategy seems to 
create a universal picture of the phenomenon of conflict, allowing a scientific approach to 
be taken through generalisation. Along with this research strategy, the “differentialist” way 
turns out to be helpful in classifying unique features of diverse conflict situations. Both of 
the outlined strategies possess methodological potential, which surely finds its realisation 
in the theoretical representation of the phenomenon of conflict within various social and 
political disciplines. 
Nevertheless, whether in combination or otherwise, these ways can hardly be relied 
upon when one practices being-in-conflict. Conflict types, models, schemes and strategies 
of its theoretical resolution as knowledge are undoubtedly helpful in providing scientific 
research in the field of conflict studies. Theoretical construction usage is surely to be ap-
proved in the light of solving research problems. Yet, despite its positive function in con-
structing a “world picture,” by means of which man is orientated towards the world, the 
scientific methodology lacks instrumentation in experiencing the phenomenon of con-
flict “the hard way.” Science as the “theory of the real” [34, p. 157] is actually useless for 
people who are experiencing real conflicts as their own problems within actual existential 
situations (see as well: [35]). Science often fails in producing answers to questions related 
to the meaning-of-life [36, p. 15; 37, p. 6]. A claim such as “you might have known how to 
be / how to act” lacks productivity in the context of a real event, which happens with an in-
dividual in a unique way. The question “how to be?” cannot be resolved theoretically [38]; 
moreover, while this problem may seem to have a purely ethical dimension, it should 
also be considered at a deeper ontological level. Immanuel Kant taught that, in belong-
ing to the sphere of “things-in-themselves” and being embodied by practical reason, the 
act remains unapproachable to science, with the speculative reason operating only in the 
world of “thing appearance” [39, p. 137–155]. With regard to conflict, one deals on an exis-
tential level not with its theoretical model, but with the real, unique situation, by which one 
is entirely seized. This aspect appears to be explained more clearly according to the early 
philosophy of Mikhail Bakhtin, who distinguishes “practical” and “theoretical” dimen-
sions of human existence [38; 40, p. 278]. In Bakhtinian terms, the entirety of Being may 
be achieved only in a “practical” way through the participative experiencing of an event 
within one’s own existentiality [38, p. 8]. When experienced participatively, conflict at any 
scale appears to be inseparable from the situation of inner struggle, which is practiced in 
terms of conflict with one’s own self. The presence of this “inner” dimension conditioned 
the choice of existential-phenomenological methodology in the designated sense.
This paradox of theory and practice turns out to be sharpened within the certain 
conditions of the contemporary situation. As Martin Heidegger characterises these con-
ditions, contemporaneity is revealed to be the planning-calculating provision of all things 
[24]. As features of contemporary science, abstraction, “a stand in objectness” and formal-
schematic re-presentation leave their stamp on contemporary man’s way of thinking [34, 
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p. 167; 41, p. 238, 253–254]. It is convenient to use the “planning-calculating” strategy in 
diverse cases; however, this strategy may be unsuitable for some situations, at least insofar 
as not all situations consist in manipulations carried out on and with “things.” Including 
conflict, the situations of existential seizure appear to be “pure events,” in terms of Gilles 
Deleuze [42, p. 146]. In an event, we deal with motion and dynamics; however, taking a 
scientific approach, we can only submit a construction of knowledge, i.e. only a fixing of 
an event as its picture. Even if we try to reproduce motion, illusion will be produced by 
applying the principle of changing pictures, points or “sections” of motion, as is realised 
in cinema (see as well: [43, p. 4]). In this way, we will find ourselves at the very heart of 
Zeno’s classical paradoxes. If we try to perform an operation of “standing” the experience 
of conflict “in objectness,” the real will escape; it will be passed over and, hence, will re-
main inaccessible (see as well: [34, p. 179]). 
Further, in this paper, metaphorically speaking, paradox is used as an “instrument,” 
with which the fundamental nature of conflict is considered from an ontological perspec-
tive. Numerous philosophers have understood the category of the paradoxical within Be-
ing as an “indicator” of an interesting sophisticated situation that requires investigation 
[44, p. 45–106; 45, p. 252–277; 46; 47; 42]. Each of these thinkers deals with the paradox in 
his own way, whether in showing it, describing it, experiencing it or playing it out. How-
ever, what is common to all of them is that the paradox marks the “place” of the ultimate 
problematic, through which we get an opportunity to deal directly with Being. This “dark 
place” turns out to be unclear due to the requirement for actual personal involvement in 
experiencing the paradox, which is rather difficult and unusual to deal with. If paradox 
were to be perceived as a simple contradiction, then logical analysis might easily have sub-
lated it. Nevertheless, in cases of one’s entire absorption by the sense of paradox and by its 
irrationality, reasoning and theorising lack explanatory power when faced with profound 
difficulties. Even the contemporary thinkers of the “rational corps” tend to notice that 
paradoxes should be learned for how to deal with excluding both ignorance and overcom-
ing them. For instance, Ray Brassier, one of the famous speculative realists, claims that 
these difficulties cannot be simply circumvented by dispensing them with “dualisms such 
as those of meaning and being, and of knowing and feeling” [48, p. 291]. 
In regard to the existential-phenomenological investigation of the ontological para-
dox, such contemporary Russian thinkers as Merab Mamardashvili, Vladimir Bibikhin and 
Elena Bakeeva have undertaken much work in this area. Merab Mamardashvili practices 
the comprehension of the “impossible possibility” of Being through an existential analysis 
of experiencing the paradoxical nature of time [49], consciousness [50–52], the cultural 
phenomena and of the philosopher’s calling [53; 54]. Despite Mamardashvili paying little 
attention to providing an ordered, systematic description of his method, his in-action ap-
proach proves to be productive in making the actual state of affairs clear. His philosophy 
helps the reader’s vision to adapt itself to the essence of considered phenomena and resist 
giving way to the illusions that tend to appear around the most important “meaning-of-
life” questions. Vladimir Bibikhin similarly aims at achieving clarity in terms of what is 
dealt with on the ontological level, i.e. at understanding the sense of the fundamental 
ultimate grounds of Being. In cases that involve dealing with a problem, he notices that an 
immediate resort to “activism” or “taking action” lacks productivity [55, p. 15–16, 20; 56; 
57]. According to Bibikhin, actual sense is expected to be opened while hovering over the 
problem for quite some time by means of special thoughtful effort restraining ourselves 
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from the drive to immediate decision-making. This passage allows for a consideration of 
the problems within the entirety of their paradoxical nature, which simultaneously lacks 
prepared solutions and permits the possibility of an actual understanding of the situa-
tion. As practiced by Mamardashvili and Bibikhin, this variant of the phenomenological 
approach enriches with experience and sense as well as teaching how to scrutinise every 
problem attentively. 
Elena Bakeeva is also worth mentioning in the context of developing a methodology 
for dealing with paradoxes. In Accepting the Paradox, or an Effort of Humility, Bakeeva pro-
vides insight into the existential aspect of the contemporary situation in order to rethink 
such ontological categories as ground, sense, freedom, the I, the Other, love, God, reality, 
time, life and Being [58]. In this work, the thinker unfolds a participative experiencing of 
the paradoxical nature of any theoretical choice. The situation of pluralism makes a seri-
ous junction with one of the available points of view honestly impossible, as far as one’s 
own ground and the entirety of Being prove to be unreachable in this case [59]. In order 
to accept this paradox, effort is required; it is only through such an effort that it becomes 
possible to comprehend the situation in a practical way and to explain it as productive-for-
thyself. For example, the paradox of the Other consists in the fact that “I can neither merge 
with the Other, nor do away with him” [58, p. 32]. Thus, this paradox is established in 
order to deal with the acceptance of the difference of ontological grounds of the I and the 
Other. This act of acceptance opens up the possibility of understanding man’s particular 
position within Being, which establishes a proportionality between the need for one other 
in order to feel the “voltage difference” and harmless ontological co-existence due to the 
difference between our positions [58, p. 33].
The fundamental ontological paradox reveals itself in this situation through the fact 
that the disinclination to confront the paradoxical nature of our own reason — or, more 
broadly, any human rule of thumb at the level of words — results in a turning away from 
sense. Man cannot live a fully-fledged life without sense; however, the path to sense goes 
by way of paradox, which may only be dealt with by the “creative” constituent of our mind. 
As has been thematised by, for example, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze 
and other poststructuralists [25; 60; 42], the paradoxical nature of sense consists in the fact 
that, being the “expressible of proposition” [42, p. 19–22], it is itself contained neither in 
words, nor in things. Things and words are always guaranteed along with the other given 
symmetricities to be irreducible to each other; sense, on the other hand, is unguaranteed 
and unprepared, always requiring an effort of understanding without which it cannot ex-
ist. Pythagoreans and Aristotle dealt with similar pairs: in Being, we somehow deal simul-
taneously with right and left, male and female, even and odd, etc. Between these opposite 
extremes, something in the middle is absent and is unachievable by an admixture of them. 
These symmetric pairs then seem to be given on the ground of something “presymmetric” 
[55, p. 326]. This presymmetric One is known to be noncalculable, though it may be felt 
through and met in everything, as was discovered by Parmenides, who referred to it under 
“Being.” When dealing with these kinds of pairs, we “hang” in-between them and feel that 
we are in a paradoxical situation, since the two opposite ends are given, but we deal with 
them through something referred to in terms of the “third.” 
In a paradoxical way, we have already had the sought-for, which represents a “thing” 
that tends to be intangible in the situation of the pursuit of the “third” and that tends to 
never be achieved on any of the two opposing sides of a willed theoretical choice. Such 
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“escaping things” as sense, truth, time, God and Being escape neither due to our awkward-
ness, nor due to the absence of methods of apperceiving them. According to their nature, 
these “things” prove to be “behind our back” [61, p. 23]; they themselves lighten for us 
our fundamental already-being-disunited into words and things, soul and body, good and 
evil. We can neither sublate nor refuse this duality by means of our will, nor can we skill-
fully choose one of the two opposing sides, since our disunity has been already established 
other than by means of our own act of will. While dealing with the paradox, neither re-
fusal, nor a drive towards its immediate resolution, is productive. Conversely, learning to 
work with paradox is of great interest, since, along with its logical impossibility, we are 
provided with an opportunity to bear something out in the process of understanding — at 
least, to bear the unbearableness of the situation of the fundamental paradox, to which we 
are inevitably condemned as a consequence of our nature.
Thus, the paradox is perceived in such a way that, at the level of sense, we feel a kind 
of incompatibility, which detains our thought to run through its space evenly. Neither 
manipulation with meanings, nor any rearrangement of things in the world offers a result, 
since paradox cannot be considered as a simple contradiction. The paradox seizes with 
its fundamental strangeness, requiring special attention. When trying to deal with such 
things on the level of sense in the process of understanding, we obtain access to “that, by 
virtue of which” everything exists in a certain way. Nevertheless, it remains unapproach-
able as “something,” eluding the grasp and continuing to escape, though we prove to be 
seized by Being, or by its fundamental paradox, or by the question about Being. Hence 
it becomes clear that the ontological paradox is solitary in spite of our dealing with it 
in different situations, on the material of diverse content and in various modifications. 
However, the understanding of the singularity of the paradox of our Being does not make 
a solution easier, since an experiencing of the paradox occurs every time in a unique way 
and it must take place anew every time, i.e. it must take place on the existential level. The 
singularity of the paradox may serve rather as an instrument of the elimination of the fun-
damental fear of non-being, which we risk falling into after the awareness of incertitude 
of any human situation within Being [62]. Though each person experiences paradoxical-
ity in his or her own individual way, the positive moment consists in a universal form of 
the ontological paradox. Consequently, others also deal with it: that is why, even being 
separate within his or her own situation, each person is not alone within Being. As the 
“propaedeutic,” such moments appear to be productive and helpful in setting oneself up 
for an “adaptation” of the own vision. Due to this purified vision, we achieve in its entirety 
an “impossible possibility” of understanding the situation, with which we face.
In accordance with the described methodology, in order to understand what we deal 
with in a conflict situation and to grasp the ontological sense of the phenomenon of con-
flict, it is necessary to embody a practical experience of experiencing of the paradoxical 
nature of conflict. Practicing this methodology is sure to be rather difficult due to the risk 
of experiencing a kind of injury while dealing with the “inner dimension” of the paradox; 
fortunately, other ways exist, aimed at approaching the entity of conflict. Nevertheless, 
due to the decision of taking a leap in the absolute uncertainty and strangeness of the 
paradox, something new may be born from this existential-phenomenological investiga-
tion; this alternative vision may also be helpful in understanding the new planes of the 
phenomenon of conflict. Though this method is paradoxical in itself, it is one of the ways 
of approaching the phenomenon of conflict. 
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However, in our case, being existentially weighted, the paradox is deeper. Even if we 
were able to identify the type of conflict within which we find ourselves, and even if we knew 
about the possible ways of its development and of its resolution, we would ourselves have 
to act and make choices at our own risk. As Immanuel Kant warned, knowledge proves to 
be useless in a situation within which an act is required. Responsibility for the real situation 
appears to be maximal and ultimate; here we cannot allow ourselves to make a mistake. It is 
fearful for us to carry out experiments with our own lives “in vivo” as it was “in vitro.” In this 
situation, we should not test the capability of all alternatives since this game may result in 
such consequences as quarrelling with others or even, in some cases, fatality. Calculating the 
probability of an event’s development will always leave the possibility for the most negative 
conclusion and thus only strengthen our existential anxiety. And, even if this kind of exis-
tential situation is experienced by someone who is a scientist, researcher — i.e. calculative 
according to their calling — and, hence, if they cannot deal with the situation in any other 
way except calculation and rational analysis in light of their freedom; nevertheless, the con-
flict situation remains a noncalculable moment of faith or resolute desire. 
Resolution is an event, an act, which is noncalculable in of itself. Either it happens 
in its entirety, like a flash, illuminating everything around it, or resolute desire does not 
result and a person feels at a loss among aporias. Neither force, nor calculation, proves to 
be helpful in this situation. Then, how does one get out of this paradox? Is resolute desire 
a path, an exit? Yes and no. Yes, it is, since the reality of one’s own act is impossible without 
it. And no, it is not, since it cannot be created as desired, i.e. it is impossible to create a 
strategy of reaching the moment of resolute desire. However, are we doing anything else 
except finding a solution in order to get out of the situation of the real conflict, which has 
seized us? Actually, the aim of this research consists, first of all, not in resolving conflict, 
but in understanding its entity. It is important to restrain oneself from striving to solve 
conflict immediately and, instead, to try to hover over the experiencing of conflict in or-
der to get an opportunity to touch its fundamental nature. For this reason, the difference 
between the practical experience of conflict of any scale and theorising about it is empha-
sised, since practice allows the entity of conflict to be seen in its entirety, and, among other 
things, manages it in a paradoxical way.
3. Paradox of I and the Other within the context of “good” 
and “evil” as a root of any conflict
Thus, the moment we attempt to get closer to the conflict through the experiencee of 
being-seized by this situation, we encounter repulsion. We have been thrown into conflict 
resolution; it is bound to happen due to the unbearableness of the situation of conflict. 
As soon as we begin to deal with the possible consequences, our finitude appears on the 
horizon. Finitude “switches on” an existential anxiety in us and this anxiety is unbearable. 
And, reacting against the unbearableness of the thought concerning finitude, the mecha-
nism turns on automatically, causing a drive to solve, to overcome — or, as another vari-
ant of immediate reaction, to ignore conflict. In this way, an immediate necessity arises to 
perform any reaction certainly, resolving the situation in order to dispose of the painful 
anxiety. It is at this point that we decide with certainty who is good and who is bad, who 
is just and who is unjust. We are sure insofar as it seems that there is nothing to ques-
tion — everything is already clear. Here it is appropriate to recall the remarkable dialogue 
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between Socrates and Alcibiades [7]. Only enmity, force and war seem to be efficient in 
proving our justice for those who misunderstand, for whom our resolute desire remains 
unobvious. Somehow all at once, I, my party, my country, my side prove to be good and 
just; we do not know why, but we are always already certain about such states of affairs. 
Words appear to be already helpless in providing an alternative explanation, since in this 
situation we have already missed the moment of that decision about good and evil, just 
and unjust. From whence have we already obtained knowledge about such things?
Here it becomes dark, however positive is the fact that we have noticed it and have 
stopped ourselves in order to pay attention to this moment. In Aristotle’s terms, man ap-
pears to be an ethical “animal” or a political one [63, p. 9–11]. For us, man, the question 
is always about good and evil, just and unjust and is always “painted” in some “colours.” 
Due to our existential nature, we seem to be incapable of avoiding the automatic differ-
entiation of everything into the categories of good and evil. Already present for us in our 
childhood, our finitude seems to compel us to differ and distinguish. Appearing thus on 
the horizon, the limitation of our existence turns out to compel us to choose only what 
is fit. However, not everything is sure to be fit, since a lifetime cannot be wasted on con-
sidering all alternatives; consequently, in order to choose only what is good-for-us from 
everything existing, the ability to see good and evil simultaneously seems to be necessary. 
Returning to our question about the source of our knowledge about good and evil, justice 
and injustice in and of themselves, we should scrutinise the situation more attentively. We 
know about it precisely from nowhere. Finally, Alcibiades declares himself an “ignorant” of 
just and unjust; Socrates summarizes: “Consider; I believe you will fail to find such a time 
[when you hesitated to decide immediately about just and unjust]” [7, p. 123]. Should we 
find such a time or should we seek out of time? The paradox looms large here. Analysing 
the question about the origin of war (which represents a variant of conflict, its synonym in 
a broad sense), Vladimir Bibikhin proposes the following passage [55, p. 192]:
People wage war not for things in existence. A nation would not rise to a war aiming at 
driving the neighbouring nation back by several kilometres or at teaching them the niceties of 
table manners. A nation-wide mobilisation is called for insofar as the neighbouring nation acted 
unjustly, proved to be evil, vicious and has a wrong false faith… Man lights up, having a burning 
desire, only from lacking, non-existent things. I will plunder and kill not because I have to eat 
something and to watch television and video, using the corresponding devices, but because I lack 
peace inside of me. 
Hence, in the case of waging war, or more widely, in the case of participating in con-
flict, we are driven by this decision, which we have automatically adopted in a hurry, about 
good and evil, innocent and guilty, just and unjust. We are ruled by an implicit assurance; 
however, this automatic vein appears to be a breakdown. Concerning good and evil, nei-
ther knowledge, nor decision-making, is initial. The initial consists in our fundamental ig-
norance, misunderstanding and incapability to resolve the situation. Firstly, if everything 
is clear, a thought is absent and a motion is impossible. Only misunderstanding provides 
an opportunity for understanding to appear. Secondly, any awkward situation turns out to 
be a marking of the paradox, and the paradox is a marking of Being, of the real, of sense 
[45, p. 252–277; 42]. We are afraid to take a leap into the darkness of the paradox due to 
the fundamental uncertainty of what is waiting for us inside the paradox. Thirdly, arising 
from the paradox, fundamental incertitude awakes fear in us, initialising a drive to recoil 
quickly and run away in order to escape the state of total uncertainty. Indeed, as numerous 
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thinkers notice, people decide to take a leap into the paradox perhaps “out of the bare ne-
cessities of life,” with despair reaching its bottom. The logical constituent of our thinking 
will never accept the paradox, since the paradox is perceived by it as an annoying absurd-
ity, which should be eliminated or overcome. Nevertheless, the absurd is the human expe-
rience of being-seized by love, faith, despair and sorrow. Hence, as Bibikhin argues, a war 
occurs only around “non-existent things” [55, p. 192], even, more precisely, around both 
“existent and non-existent” things, which are experienced by one our constituent and are 
rejected by the other one. We ourselves appear to be walking paradoxes! And, first of all, 
the paradox opens in that I seem to be the Other for myself as far as, being simultaneously 
experiencing something and thinking of its sense, I do not coincide with myself. We turn 
out to be places of unfolding of the fundamental paradox, from out of which its possible 
content variants spout, being perceived as contradictions, aporias, incompatibilities, etc. 
The unbearableness of the paradox contains two dimensions: we cannot exclude it from 
the inside of ourselves, but we also cannot bear it. It is precisely due to this double-faced 
unbearableness that we “lack peace inside” [55, p. 192] meaning we lack the very unity; 
each of us deals, first of all, with “inner war”, the impossibility of avoiding which compels us 
to convey the war inside-to-out, i.e. into the surrounding reality. 
The energy of the unresolved inner conflict of me and I as the inner Other for myself 
proves to be easily redirected outside and to be transmuted into various types of confron-
tation with any outer Other, whether they are a concrete person, a group, a structure, a 
party, a nation, etc. Diverse structures use it and seem to have been using it at all times, 
changing only the content of appeals and the transmitting media. As Georg Simmel notic-
es, the “average man” may be characterised by the incredibly easy suggestibility of a hostile 
attitude of mind [64]. It is more difficult to inspire a favour and trust to the Other, than to 
inspire a negative opinion about them, which forms itself almost automatically. If imagi-
nation becomes aware of any possible unfairness or injustice concerning the Other, it will 
immediately complete the formation of an image justifying hostility. This fact may be also 
due to the paradoxical position of man within Being. As Mikhail Bakhtin writes, every I is 
sure to be provided with “the uniqueness and irreplaceability of [their] place in the world” 
[65, p. 23]. This means that one-and-only-one point of view is given to every I within Be-
ing; nobody can actually occupy the Other’s place. Consequently, human finitude turns 
out to consist not only in the limitedness of our lifetime, but also in our topological bor-
dering with the Others. People tend to be rather sensitive to such a limited position within 
Being, perceiving it as a constant lack of wholeness. Due to this, desire seems to appear in 
order to overcome the temporariness of human existence, achieving immortality in this or 
that way. Frequently this desire takes the form of will to overcome the topological, point-
like character of one’s own Being, tending either to receive the possibilities of the Others 
into itself, or to liquidate them. 
Nevertheless, the consideration of all possibilities should put us on guard by its in-
finitude. Man categorically cannot realise all the other possibilities within his only life; 
each can realise just his own way of being within his own existence. In the Republic, Plato 
illustrates that a vast number of conflicts within society occur due to some people ignor-
ing their own way of being, which is all that is actually accessible [8 p. 97–125]. Moreover, 
the only criterion against the entirety, self-realisation and happiness consists in following 
one’s own. Insofar as public opinion tells us something different about happiness, numer-
ous people appear to be easily swayed by it and inattentive to themselves; being busy with 
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a “money spinner” instead of their own calling. In this case, neither power, nor prosperity 
satisfies; one begins to seize everything around due to continuing to be unseized by the 
own way of being. Finally, suffering from the lack of the entirety of Being, people get of-
fended and automatically vent their anger on the Other. However, this fact frequently is 
not considered, since one is sure about the other people — as if it is the others who are tak-
ing away a part of his or her own possible realisations. The acceptance of the Other occurs 
completely and absolutely only within our own self-supportability and self-actualisation 
and comes marked by the state of love as readiness for acceptance and understanding of 
everything and everyone as they are. When we realise our own way of being, which fills our 
life with sense and makes us happy, we become fulfilled in an intensive way, i.e. without 
seizure of the other places. In this situation, the Other obviously cannot do harm to one’s 
self-actualisation, since the Other is who realises another possibility. Nevertheless, peo-
ple often continue to convey their inner conflict inside-to-out, trying to involve as many 
others as possible in it. Such people tend to think that this process provides them with 
ascendancy over others. However, as far as this entirety remains unreachable by means 
of considering alternatives, these people remain unhappy. Despite the anger these people 
provoke in us, trying to control us and interrupting the process of our self-realisation, they 
actually need just to be pitiful to them. 
Naturally, nobody is guaranteed against involvement in external conflicts, into which 
we appear to be provoked everyday by others, including mass media. However, featuring 
the free man, spontaneity and natural irrational unpredictability work reliably against the 
planning-calculating attitude of these structures towards everyone. People who lack peace 
inside-to-out, try to involve us in the conflict in order to make us play their game, to be 
afraid of them, break down and subordinate ourselves to them. Although no prepared for-
mula can be given on how to act in such situations, what is helpful is to develop an ability to 
hesitate, to mark time, to restrain our own temper and hold our own reactivity in check. A 
helpful approach is to let the situation go and to give oneself up to it; and if we at the same 
time try to avoid “taking action,” dwelling inside the ultimate readiness to meet the situation 
being unprepared and comprehending it in “here-and-now,” when it comes, the path will 
show itself. The situation will indicate the needed path and the answer sought for. Here we 
deal neither with being ahead of the provoking person, nor with punishing them for injus-
tice. Embodying a vindicatory punishment is sure to be out of our control; moreover, this 
impulse has already been embodied within the wretched existence of such a person. As for 
us, it is simply important to remain being ourselves- human in such situations, whether they 
occur in war or in times of peace, at work, in family or within public policy. 
Nevertheless, self-realisation according to one’s own way of being cannot serve as a 
panacea for all woes; moreover, acceptance of one’s own uniqueness appears neither to 
be a way of eliminating conflicts, nor something that divides us into “good” and “bad.” 
Obviously, both good and evil are equally inherent in everyone; regardless of “knowing 
thyself,” everyone is potentially able both to make malicious mischief and to bonify. 
Moreover, we cannot decide with our will “to become an advocate of good and justice 
starting from today.” Neither “advocates of good and justice,” nor anyone else among 
people seem to know — or even are able to know — what will produce good and justice 
within their acts. Performing the honest complete acceptance of our finitude, our lim-
itedness, our paradoxical nature, we accept in this act the whole world, including the 
“splitted” I and the unreachable Other. It appears to be very important: an activism of 
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“taking action” is certain to be the reverse side of genuine acceptance; non-acceptance 
of the world, of the Other and of one’s given position within Being displays itself in hur-
rying to “take action.” When we reject everything as it truly exists, we bear this rejection 
externally, trying to control the Others, to reorganise Nature beyond measure and to 
create someone planned and other from the ourselves. What is obvious is the destruc-
tiveness of the refusal to Being in acceptance of the all as it is: both the world and man 
in ruin. These moments are thematised in detail in the philosophy of Erich Fromm, who 
pays special attention to the fundamental problems of co-existence with Others [66; 67]. 
Hence, without the complete acceptance of the Other and without love towards them it 
proves to be almost impossible to avoid bearing the inner conflict inside-to-out. In this 
act, we deal with inner work with the entity of any conflict, which has seized us, becom-
ing, consequently, our inner one. 
4. Social dimension of unresolved inner conflict 
and the paradoxical way of solution
In the light of the discussed above idea of easy suggestion of the hostile attitude of 
mind, the following moments on the manipulation of public conscience should be con-
sidered in the context of acceptance and non-acceptance of the fundamental ontological 
paradox and readiness and unreadiness to work with it. The constructing of a positive 
image of, for instance, a government or a native country, may be achieved automatically 
by representing the “opposite” structure in negative colours. It seems to be difficult to 
compel someone to believe that “our” proves to be undoubtedly good, since its numerous 
problems are plain to see. On the other hand, it is much easier to create an illusion around 
the negativisation of the “other side,” which becomes perceived as an opposing one to the 
“our.” Then it tends to automatically follow to the “average man” that if “bad” belongs to 
the quasi-opposing side, “good” is sure to be located thereafter on their own side. Due 
to our ethical nature, we are certain to distinguish between good and evil; nevertheless, 
few people reflect on the fact that the borderline between good and evil should be drawn in 
oneself and should be constantly reconsidered. Insofar as it is pleasant to identify oneself 
with the “good” side, it turns out to be simpler to draw the borderline externally. During 
the 20th century, mass media appears to have largely assumed the function of forming 
the world picture in human consciousness on this basis, taking this function away from 
science. Returning to Kant, science cannot and should not form judgements concerning 
ethical aspects. Consequently, science may lay claim only to an incomplete world pic-
ture, which lacks answers to questions about good and evil. Then the “average man” loses 
faith in the strength and explanatory power of the scientific world picture, and especially 
with the complexity, mathematisation and abstractedness of what contemporary science 
contributes. Accordingly, this niche has been occupied mainly by mass media in the con-
temporary era. Although the picture they form turns out to be fragmentary and fleeting, 
nevertheless, it is apparently easy to understand and it appears to provide some reference 
points on questions of good and evil. 
In this context, the following rationalisation also seems to be rather productive. Large-
scale warfare and conflicts occur at moments critical for the mass human consciousness. 
These large-scale wars tend to mark the so-called “end of an era,” i.e. historical periods 
change from one to another, forming a joining point that coincides with the experienced 
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multilateral armed conflict. During periods of significant changes in world-view, it be-
comes literally unbearable to lose the former grounds, which had seemed so stable. When 
the former principles stop working and producing sense within fast changing conditions, 
searching for new reference points is a painful process. As far as the complete incertitude 
of one’s existence displays itself clearly, it becomes necessary to tackle the problem of fun-
damentally rethinking everything, starting “from scratch.” This act proves to be extremely 
complicated and risky; therefore, being unready for this, numerous people hurry to re-
solve the unbearable inner tension that is felt as “hanging over the abyss.” Various struc-
tures around are always here to “help,” promising the Good, an easy way and a prepared 
solution; however, these structures are actually aimed at possessing and controlling these 
people. Naturally, one agrees to the offered outer substructures, since one does not desire 
to meet the situation of the absence of a reliable ground with courage and self-sustainabili-
ty. On the face of it, these substructures appear to be rather harmless, as with, for example, 
contemporary advertising. However, phantasms and illusions generated within us prove 
to be dangerous due to their replacement of our own thinking in our consciousness. They 
offer us “protection” from the gaping source of problems, which is recursively enrooted in 
our lack of readiness to deal with it using our own resources. In this way, suspiciousness to 
any other emerges naturally, followed by an explicit enmity and desire to liquidate the oth-
er positions, which involves fighting those structures’ corner and even laying down one’s 
own life for it. In this way, the Roman Empire seemed to collapse in classical antiquity. 
In this way, the Medieval Crusades took their place. In this way, the Renaissance with its 
Protestant Reformation and Counter-Reformation culminated in the Thirty Years’ War. In 
this way, the Enlightenment failed to save from the Napoleonic Wars. Lasting for already 
more than two centuries and continuing to deepen, the crisis of European rationality con-
tinues to “thrill” the world with the global conflicts in exactly the same way. The difference 
in the contemporary situation consists perhaps just in the scale and sophistication of the 
forms and ways of waging a never-ending war: weapons, ideology, information, economic 
pressure, proxy warfare, space technological race, etc. 
Undoubtedly, not everyone is easily swayed by mass media, since the “reality” pre-
sented by mass media turns out to be absurd and contradictory, therefore to eventually 
lead precisely nowhere. When we hesitate and feel the lack of resolute desire, beginning 
to doubt in the fitness of such a picture of reality, we have an opportunity to hover over 
this situation of the insolvability of what comprises a “good” reference point. This is 
also certain to be the case of the conflict situations, which are infixed into us and sur-
round us: Which religion provides a reliable ground for my acts? Which nation is right 
in the civil war? Which party should I choose? Who is just among my colleagues? Are 
my relatives and friends right in this or that question? Supposedly, without being in a 
hurry to resolve the conflict, the attentive scrutinising is expected to allow us a resolute 
desire of another kind. This alternative resolute desire is to declare ourselves to be igno-
rant of what “actually” comprises good and evil. From whence could this knowledge be 
made available to us finite limited creatures? However, here we are not dealing with the 
hopeless existential situation; on the contrary, we are dealing with the moment, within 
which we get an only chance to act in a productive way and to understand something 
for ourselves. 
Thus, representing unreadiness to stop thyself when dealing with the ontological 
paradox within the own situation, the frequent behaviour of the “average man” seems to 
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explain a slide into non-acceptance, hostility and war. We tend to bear conflict inside-
to-out due to the unbearableness of the conflict with oneself, which, in its turn, appears 
to be the conflict of fundamental duality of the human nature. The inner conflict may 
therefore represent the conflict of inability to deal with our paradoxical nature, which 
displays itself to us as a quasi-confrontation of the own and the other, of the whole and 
the fragmentary, of entirety and lack, of freedom and necessity, etc. It may seem that 
Good is located only on one of these two sides. Nevertheless, while following through 
the experience of dealing with the fundamental ontological paradox in a phenomeno-
logical manner, we find that the Good is located prior to this difference, being, moreo-
ver, provided not by us. Undoubtedly, participating in the outer conflict appears to be 
just one among other cases of escaping from the unbearableness of the inner; despairing 
of the encounter with their own paradoxical nature, numerous people drive themselves 
to mental disorder, drug or alcohol use. Then, can we somehow change the situation for 
the better at all? Oh, would that we knew where the better was! We are not Gods — we 
lack this knowledge. Then, what shall we do within this paradoxical situation? The ques-
tion turns out to be incorrect, as Heidegger explains: “Before considering the question 
that is seemingly always the most immediate one and the only urgent one, What shall we 
do? we ponder this: How must we think?” [68, p. 40]. Accordingly, it is more productive 
if we restrain ourselves from the activism of “taking action,” at least until we understand 
what and how we are dealing with. We may think in some other way in order to enter 
a state of harmony with this comprehensive strangeness, including the strangeness of 
such a quantity of the repetitions of an undigested experience of war in the history of 
humankind. It seems to be more productive to accept the fundamental paradox, stop-
ping in front of it with the courage of humility. Being placed into human beings not by 
the human beings themselves, the enigma of the strangeness of the human nature must 
be understood as non-uprootable and unresolvable by the human beings. However, we 
may also abstain from the contemporary approach of dealing with the world instead of 
dealing with ourselves and with the opened-for-man paradox. 
Within our own existential situation, the effort of acceptance of the fundamental 
ontological paradox opens a paradoxical possibility for our whole Being, for the entirety 
of our own belonging to Being and for wholeness as fulfilment. Nevertheless, as has been 
shown, acceptance of the paradox comes only through tremendous effort. The state of 
acceptance may also be noticed to be very difficult to stay in; due to our nature, we fall 
out of our own place of “being-seized” by Being. However, the productivity of this state 
is obvious; hence, the will to return to this state also appears to be natural. If any actual 
ethics are possible for man, then it turns out to be an ethics of effort of acceptance, 
which here coincides with ontology. Good — and the entirety of Being as Good — may 
be opened due to the effort of acceptance of all and being in agreement with everything. 
We appear to be able to come into such a state of the own by means of fine tuning of 
oneself in an attempt to accept everything as a substitute for “taking action.” Conse-
quently, by marking time for a while and restraining ourselves from immediate activism 
within the situation of conflict, it appears that the conflict of any scale consists in our 
own stabbing by the non-acceptance of the state of affairs, including our own position. 
Nevertheless, if we scrutinise this fact attentively, it may be noticed that, prior to any 
decision taken by ourselves, our own position as the one-and-only good has already 
been provided within Being itself. However, this also means that we lack a guarantee of 
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having good and justice on our side without an effort; on the contrary, as Kierkegaard 
repeatedly claims, “we are always in the wrong” [69, p. 595–609]. In order to understand 
productively, it proves to be sufficient to practice the fine tuning of oneself to the vi-
sion of the fact that we are provided with everything necessary, even despite the lack of 
knowledge about good and evil, justice and injustice, truth and falsity. We discover the 
absence of incompleteness and, ultimately, non-being in the world; other modes, states 
and ways of being are likely to exist and all of them appear to be existent within Being 
in such a way as is necessary. In this context, one of the variations of the fusion of ethics 
and ontology may have been represented in the Leibnizian idea of this actual universe 
as the most perfect among all possible ones [70].
As can be seen from the above, while, on the face of it, the existential effort of ac-
ceptance seems to change nothing in any “outer” state of affairs; paradoxically, it actually 
changes everything, turning “minus” into “plus” in our “inner” dimension. We remain 
in the same place anyway, since the effort aimed at taking us out of this place is impos-
sible and hence unproductive. Nevertheless, through the acceptance of everything in its 
entirety including the duality of “good” and “bad,” “I” and “Other,” “light” and “dark,” etc., 
we return to the own, including the acceptance of this own as inevitable. What do we need 
this for? Only through the own, only finding oneself within the own place and only with 
the courageous acceptance of the own finitude, limitedness and paradoxical nature, we be-
come able to produce sense, to understand, to be attentive to everything around us — and 
to act. Consequently, the fine-tuning of oneself in terms of the harmonisation of self-state 
turns out to be what is ultimately common to humanity, i.e. what makes a person who he 
or she actually is. Then, may we dream about the elimination of all conflicts? Unfortu-
nately, no, since the paradox, which includes the mode of conflict, seems to be inevitable 
for the human nature. Conflicts will continue to take place independently of our effort of 
acceptance; nevertheless, in the present work, I have attempted to develop an approach 
towards an understanding of the fundamental nature of conflict in the light of this effort. 
This approach consists in the practicing of an actual existential-phenomenological work 
with and on oneself, which I have tried to demonstrate within this research. These meth-
odological results are in agreement with those achieved by such Russian phenomenolo-
gists as M. Bakhtin, M. Mamardashvili, V. Bibikhin and E. Bakeeva, whose tradition I carry 
on in an attitude of hope and respect.
5. Conclusion
In the present paper, I have followed a serious — and even, as may be argued, rather 
overambitious — aim that consists in arriving at an understanding of the fundamental 
nature of conflict. However, whether successful or not, philosophical research following 
such an aim should be continued. The search for a unified grounding of the phenomenon 
of conflict may provide insights both into new aspects of “outer” conflict, which may be 
valuable for science, as well as into an understanding of “inner” conflict for the individual 
person who experiences this phenomenon within their own existential situation. In light 
of the designated perspectives, a variation of the existential-phenomenological approach 
has been applied as a special work with the ontological paradox. Faced within the state of 
existential experience in its diverse variants, the paradox of Being is experienced as un-
bearable; hence, it is frequently “born out” in the form of conflict, engendering latent or 
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patently hostile attitudes towards the Other. In this research, I have developed a method-
ology of adaptation to the phenomenon of conflict infixed into the human condition; this 
methodology makes it possible to work with the situation of an “inner war,” refraining its 
bearing inside-to-out and a productive “recycling” energy of unsolved and actually non-
solvable conflict into understanding the sense of the ontological paradox. In this way, har-
monisation of self-state takes place in order to fine-tune oneself to the actual vision of the 
situation through and beyond schemes and illusions; in turn, this proves to be helpful in 
creating forces resistant to the destructive nature of conflict. Despite the introduced tech-
niques for dealing with a conflict situation, this methodology cannot be understood as 
universal in the sense of its inability to be applied “mechanically.” Harmonisation of self-
state must — and only may — be embodied by means of participative experiencing. This 
means that its reproduction appears to be possible only by means of being embodied each 
time anew, “from scratch” and in the unique way in any single case. Nevertheless, within 
the form of each concrete act, the following “steps” may be distinguished as follows. First, 
an encounter with the ontological paradox should occur in any of its content-burdened 
variants. Then an effort should be undertaken in order to accept the seized situation in its 
entirety and wholeness and, hence, in its inevitably paradoxical nature. As the following 
step, a rigorous phenomenological investigation of the paradox should take place, aimed 
at an understanding of the sense of what the experiencing one is dealing with. Finally, 
harmonisation of self-state should be practiced by means of adaptation to the paradox 
and its simultaneous fitting in the function of an “instrument” for purifying one’s own 
vision. Therefore, work with the self-state proved to be a work on fitting; it consists in 
the dynamics of fine tuning oneself to the productive vision of how everything is, which 
shows the “exit” as a path, or as the “lighting of Being” [71, p. 89]. Undoubtedly, this meth-
odology has its own disadvantages and limitations and requires further elucidation. This 
paradoxical methodology is also sure to be unsuited to a theoretical approach to problem 
solving aimed at revealing the development of trends of diverse conflicts; fortunately, nu-
merous contemporary scientists are engaged exactly in the production of these kinds of 
theories. In terms of the author’s interest, future research will focus on further elaborating 
the methodology for dealing with the ontological paradox presented in this article. This 
“inner” work is expected to be productive in diverse situations due to its methodological 
potential, which may be embodied as a means of harmonisation of self-state and a way of 
fine tuning actual understanding in the face of the dispersing and destructive tendencies 
of contemporaneity.
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В статье исследуется фундаментальная природа конфликта в  русле экзистенциально-
феноменологического подхода. Несмотря на то что проводилось огромное количество 
исследований, посвященных феномену конфликта, внимания его взаимосвязи с  он-
тологическим парадоксом не уделялось. В  данном контексте осуществляется попытка 
определить единое основание для понимания природы конфликта посредством пере-
осмысления специфического положения человека в бытии. Это становится возможным 
благодаря разворачиванию комплексной экзистенциально-феноменологической мето-
дологии, состоящей в описании опыта участного переживания парадоксальной природы 
конфликта. Очевидно, что в конфликте происходит столкновение противоположностей, 
несовозможностей, противоречащих друг другу сторон. Однако где берут начало и где 
располагаются эти противоположности  — в  «социальном измерении» между людьми 
или же фундаментальная парадоксальность укоренена в  каждом? В ходе поиска отве-
тов на подобные вопросы показывается, что равно непродуктивны как игнорирование 
(избегание) осмысления такой ситуации, так и спешка срочного разрешения конфликта, 
искусственный выбор одной из противоположностей парадокса в качестве ценностно 
более значимой. Возможным решением представляется работа с  онтологическим па-
радоксом в плане его феноменологического тщательного разбора и экзистенциального 
усилия принятия принципиальной никогда-до-конца-неразрешимости конфликта. Тем 
не менее последнее показывает парадоксальный путь продуктивного имения дела с че-
ловеческой конфликтностью, позволяющий глубоко понять ее природу в  категориях 
конечности, полноты, «внутренней войны», собственного состояния и усилия приятия. 
Данный подход может быть в дальнейшем применен как в философских, так и в научных 
исследованиях на основе представленных категорий. Например, значительный интерес 
составляет исследование таких феноменов, как кризис, привычка, изменение, инновация 
и т. д., в свете настройки собственного состояния и усилия принятия.
Ключевые слова: конфликт, природа конфликта, экзистенциально-феноменологиче-
ский подход, онтологический парадокс, усилие принятия.
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